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Abstract
A classical logic exhibits a threefold inner structure comprising an alge-
bra of propositions A, a space of “truth values” V , and a distinguished
family of mappings φ from propositions to truth values. Classically A
is a Boolean algebra, V = Z2, and the admissible maps φ : A→Z2 are
homomorphisms. If one admits a larger set of maps, one obtains an an-
homomorphic logic that seems better suited to quantal reality (and the
needs of quantum gravity). I explain these ideas and illustrate them with
three simple examples.
From a certain point of view, the phrase “classical logic” should be used in the plural,
not the singular, because the things with which logic deals depend on the “domain of
discourse”, and this can vary both with time and with the “system” one has in mind.
To each such domain corresponds its own Boolean algebra, namely the algebra A of all
“questions” one may ask about the system. 1 But a domain of questions together with rules
for combining them via and, xor, not, etc, is not all there is to a logic. In addition, one
⋆
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1 Instead of “question” one also says “predicate”, “proposition” or “event”. I will use
these terms interchangeably, and will sometimes refer to A as the “event algebra”, for lack
of a better term.
1
has the space of “answers” 2 that a question may have, which classically is Z2 = {0, 1} =
{false, true}. And one has also the space of allowed “answering maps” φ : A→Z2, which
classically coincides with the space of homomorphisms from the algebra A to the algebra
Z2. To provide such a φ (which I will refer to as a co-event since it takes events to scalars)
is to answer every conceivable question in A, and consequently to give as full a description
of the corresponding reality as is classically possible.
Seen in this way, logic has a threefold character, and one might think to generalize
the classical setup by altering any one of its basic ingredients: the algebra of propositions
A, the space of truth-values Z2, or the possible maps φ. I have proposed elsewhere [1] that
the paradoxical features of the quantum world can be understood if one fastens on the
last of these three possibilities, modifying the nature of the co-events without disturbing
either the space of truth-values or the Boolean character of the event algebra A. The
change wrought by such a modification can be thought of in different ways. One might
say that reality remains what it was for classical logic (namely an individual “history”,
in the sense of a collection of particle worldlines, for example 3), but one accepts that it
will sometimes manifest contradictory attributes; or one might say (less provocatively?)
that the conception of reality is no longer that of an individual history, but rather of a
“non-classical” co-event φ : A→Z2.
By terming φ “non-classical”, I merely mean that it is no longer required to be a
homomorphism. According to classical logic, the truth or falsity of a compound proposition
P like ‘A or B’ is unambiguously determined by the truth or falsity of its individual
constituents. In algebraic language, if we know φ(Ai) for all the constituents Ai then
we also know φ(P ), and the rules for deriving φ(P ) from the φ(Ai) say precisely that φ
is a homomorphism of A into Z2. In the type of generalization proposed in [1], this is
no longer the case. One may therefore call such a generalized logic “anhomomorphic”.
(The name “quantal logic” would also be suitable were it not already in use for a different
sort of structural modification that replaces A by the collection of subspaces of a Hilbert
2 also called “truth values”.
3 I am emphatically adopting a “histories standpoint”, according to which reality has a
“spacetime” nature, not a “spatial” one.
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space, which is a lattice but not an algebra at all in the strict sense. 4) By relaxing the
demand that a possible coevent be a homomorphism, one can accommodate contradictions
such as that of the Kochen-Specker gedankenexperiment, but of course one needs to limit
the coevents in some other manner in order to arrive at a meaningful logical framework.
Otherwise one would be unable to infer the truth or falsity of any statement about the
world from that of any others, and theoretical predictions would become impossible.
What condition, then, should replace the requirement that co-events be homomor-
phisms? But first, why do we need to replace it at all? The reason, as explained in [1],
is that we are assuming that all dynamical truths can be deduced from the preclusion of
certain events A ∈ A, expressed symbolically as φ(A) = 0. Among these events are all
those for which µ(A) = 0, where µ is the “quantal measure” furnished by the path integral
(see [1]). For example in a diffraction experiment with silver atoms, the event of the atom
going to a dark part of the interference pattern is precluded. But in combination with the
classical laws of inference this preclusion rule is too powerful. It ends up denying events
that clearly do happen. In order to accept all the preclusions furnished by quantum theory,
we must therefore give up some of the laws of classical logic. But in doing so, it is natural
to be guided by the idea that φ should remain as close to being a homomorphism as it
can.
The conditions explored briefly in [1] arose in this manner. They dealt well with several
of the simplest paradoxes, and they had the virtue of reproducing classical logic when
the pattern of preclusions was classical, but it appears that they are still too restrictive
(specifically in connection with 4-slit diffraction [2]). In this paper, I will propose a modified
set of rules, motivated by the same underlying ideas, and then illustrate the resulting logical
scheme by working out some simple examples. In fact I will describe two different schemes,
both of which seem so far to be viable.
4 One might ask with what “quantum logic” replaces the other two logical ingredients,
the space of truth-values and the homomorphism φ. As far as I know, this question has
never been answered, and therefore no definite picture of reality has been given. Instead,
one has focused on maps from the lattice to the unit interval that generalize the classical
idea of probability, rather than that of truth.
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In proposing them, I am not trying to claim that either of the new schemes will
prove to be the last word. Rather, I feel that further experimentation with the rules will
have to precede any definitive formulation. What I hope will prove to be lasting is the
insight that an “objective” interpretation of quantum mechanics can be founded on the
concept of preclusion, provided that one generalizes one’s conception of reality by admitting
anhomomorphic co-events into one’s logic.
Before turning to the specific schemes, let us look at the question in a somewhat dif-
ferent way. The problem we are faced with can be seen as a clash between two “tendencies
of nature”. On the one hand, events E of very small measure µ(E) tend not to happen.
(This is one way to think about probability as a “propensity”, in the classical case.) On
the other hand, nature tends to avoid “contradictions” among the events, which we can
express mathematically by saying that nature favors coevents φ : A→Z2 that preserve the
logical operations and, not, etc. 5 (This could seem an aesthetic requirement, since a map
between two algebras is “most naturally a homomorphism”.) Without seeking a deeper
understanding of these two tendencies, we can just accept them and ask what types of
possible realities (as co-events) they point to, given that the two tendencies oppose each
other to some extent.
If the above viewpoint is valid, then the coevent φ that actually occurs (i.e. the
coevent that describes what actually happens) results in part from a balancing of two
opposite tendencies. How this balancing takes place is something we know only in part.
But to the extent that we can guess the full scheme, we can determine which coevents
are possible and which are not (or are at least “almost forbidden”). To do so would
be to complete the path-integral formalism (which defines µ) by producing a predictive
dynamical scheme free of reference to “external observers”. (One might hope to go still
farther by formulating the dynamical laws directly in terms of the coevent itself, without
referring to µ at all; but no road toward that goal is discernible at present.)
5 One could also express this by saying that nature tends to observe the “laws of inference”
of classical logic. In the type of scheme I am proposing, there will in general be no universal
laws of inference, but only concrete inferential relationships that depend on which system
(and “initial conditions”) one is dealing with.
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To help us in our “balancing act”, we have several guides. The recovery of classical
logic in the classical limit (and ultimately of probability) is one such guide. Another is the
need to deal adequately with “product systems”, and still others are the need to furnish a
realistic account of what happens in a measurement and to respect “relativistic causality”.
However, the best single source of inspiration may be the “quantal antinomies”, by which
I mean the paradoxical experiments and thought experiments that illustrate why it is
so difficult to come up with a satisfying interpretation of the quantal formalism. These
include the EPRB experiment, where probabilistic correlations play a role, but there are
other examples in which logic alone leads to the paradox, and the latter offer easier starting
points for exploring a scheme of “anhomomorphic logic” such as I am proposing.
Before I propose any specific scheme, it would be a good idea to pause to discuss the
mathematical structures of A, with respect to which the notion of homomorphism acquires
a meaning. We will also need to refer to some of the mathematical structures possessed
by the space of coevents, i.e. by the space of functions from A to Z2. (I will call this space
A
∗ for lack of a better symbol.) In the background of both the older and newer schemes
is a space Ω of “histories” and a quantal measure µ or decoherence functional D on that
space. For brevity, I will not describe any of this in further detail, referring the reader to
[1] (and references therein) for more explanation. I will call Ω the sample space, and its
elements “formal trajectories” (by analogy with the case where γ ∈ Ω is a set of particle
worldlines). And for simplicity I will always take Ω to be finite.
On an “extensional” view, the event algebra A is simply (given that Ω is finite) the
collection of all subsets of Ω. (So an element A ∈ A is just a subset of Ω; “intensionally”
it is the corresponding “predicate” or potential “property of reality”.) As such it supports
a multitude of operations that make it, among other things, a poset, a distributive lattice
with complement, a ring, and an algebra over the finite field Z2. It is a poset
6 in an obvious
way, with respect to the ordering given by set inclusion. It is a lattice with respect to the
operations of intersection and union. (Indeed a lattice is a special case of a poset.) And it
becomes a ring if one interprets the product ‘AB’ as ‘A ∩B’ and the sum ‘A+ B’ as the
symmetric difference ‘A\B∪B\A’. (Logically, ‘AB’ is ‘A andB’, while ‘A+B’ is ‘A xorB’
[xor being “exclusive or”].) The fact that A+A = 0 makes A not only a ring but an algebra
6 partially ordered set
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over the finite field Z2, and the fact that AA = A makes it a Boolean algebra. Notice in
particular that with these definitions, A is a vector space over Z2, which is something that
could not have been deduced merely from the fact that it is a lattice with respect to “and”
and “or”. This is also a good place to point out that the space A∗ of co-events φ is also
an algebra (in fact a Boolean algebra once again), simply because it is a function-space,
and one can define addition and multiplication pointwise: (φ1φ2)(A) = φ1(A) φ2(A) and
(φ1 + φ2)(A) = φ1(A) + φ2(A).
The variety of ways in which we can conceive of A engenders a corresponding variety
of notions of what it means for a function φ : A→Z2 to be a homomorphism. All these
definitions agree when φ actually is a homomorphism, but when it deviates from being so,
they can give rise to different ways to judge by how much it has deviated. This is one
source of ambiguity in how best to balance “preclusivity” against “homomorphicity”.
I will call a coevent φ preclusive if it maps every precluded event A to zero (= false),
and “homomorphic” if it preserves the logical operations, or equivalently if it preserves
algebraic sum and product (and φ(1) ≡ φ(Ω) = 1). As explained in [1], it cannot in
general do both at once. In the schemes to be discussed, φ will be strictly preclusive, 7 so
it will of necessity be anhomomorphic. The question then becomes in what sense φ can
remain “close” to a homomorphism without being literally so.
In the scheme proposed in [1] (call it the “linear scheme”), the algebraic aspect of
A’s structure was taken as primary, meaning that preservation of sum (linearity) and of
product (“multiplicativity”) were the criteria for it to be homomorphic. Linearity was
retained exactly, but multiplicativity was dropped. In place of the latter, φ was to be
unital 8 and “minimal”. And of course it was to be preclusive, as we are assuming always.
The word minimal here refers to the support of φ, which I will define in a moment. One
says that φ is minimal if there is no (preclusive, linear) φ with smaller support. For linear
7 It seems harder to relax preclusivity in a controlled way than homomorphicity.
8 That φ is unital says merely that φ(1) = 1. For a homomorphism this is automatic
except for the trivial φ that vanishes identically: φ = 0. With events A ∈ A construed as
questions, the event 1 = Ω ∈ A asks “Does anything at all happen?”, and φ is unital iff it
answers “Yes” to this question.
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φ, φ is homomorphic iff its support is a single element of Ω. Thus one may claim that the
smaller its support, the more nearly homomorphic φ is. (The minimal such φ also generate
— i.e. they span — the whole vector space of linear preclusive coevents.)
In order to define support, we need some more notation. For γ ∈ Ω a formal trajectory,
let γ∗ : A→Z2 be the “containment” map defined by γ∗(A) = 1 if γ ∈ A, γ∗(A) = 0 if
γ /∈ A. (Instead of thinking of γ as an element of Ω one can think of it as an element of
A by identifying it with the singleton set {γ}. As such it is what is called an atom of A,
meaning a minimal element when A is regarded as a lattice. Algebraically, x is an atom
if for all y, xy is either 0 or x itself. In general it simplifies the notation to identify γ
with the corresponding atom {γ}, and I will normally do so in the sequel.) It is easy to
verify that γ∗ is a unital homomorphism of A onto Z2. (It thus may be called a “classical
coevent”.) In particular it is linear. Moreover the γ∗ are a basis for the space L(A,Z2) of
linear transformations from A into Z2. Thus every φ ∈ L(A,Z2) decomposes uniquely as
a sum of the form
φ =
∑
γ∈S
γ∗ ,
where S is some subset of Ω that one may refer to as the support of φ, supp(φ). More
generally, any mapping φ of A into Z2 whatsoever can be expressed as a polynomial in the
classical coevents γ∗ for γ ∈ Ω. 9 One may thus extend the notion of support by defining
supp(φ) to be the set of all γ∗ occurring in the polynomial.
The two schemes we will explore below are related in opposite ways to the linear
scheme. In both of them reality can be identified with a single 10 coevent φ ∈ A∗. As stated
9 This leads to a useful graphical notation in which, for x, y, z ∈ Ω, x∗ is represented
as a vertex or 0-simplex, x∗y∗ is an edge or 1-simplex, x∗y∗z∗ is a 2-simplex, etc. For
φ represented in this way and A ⊆ Ω, φ(A) = 1 iff A contains an odd number of such
simplices.
10 Here I’m imagining that A includes all possible predicates, including ones pertaining to
happenings arbitrarily far in the future (or past). If this is not the case, then one will
need to consider more than just a single event-algebra A. There will then be a coevent for
each A together with coherence conditions among these “partial coevents”. Furthermore, a
coevent which is “minimal” with respect to one such A can fail to remain so when restricted
to a subalgebra. This can lead to a kind of “premonition” phenomenon that shows up, for
example, in the Hardy gedankenexperiment discussed in [1].
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already, φ will be preclusive in both schemes (µ(A) = 0⇒ φ(A) = 0), but anhomomorphic.
The first of the two schemes will be in a sense complementary to the linear scheme. Rather
than preserving sum it will preserve product (so I’ll call it the “multiplicative scheme”).
The second scheme will be a kind of augmented linear scheme, but it will preserve strictly
neither sum nor product. For reasons that will become clear, I’ll call it the “ideal-based
scheme”. Since the multiplicative scheme is easier to define, let’s begin with it.
In this scheme, φ preserves the product, AB, which in logical terms means that it
preserves conjunction, ‘and’. Let us also exclude the trivial multiplicative coevents φ = 1
and φ = 0. The axioms for the multiplicative scheme will then include:
(i) φ 6= 0, 1
(ii) (∀A,B ∈ A) φ(AB) = φ(A)φ(B)
It is relatively easy to work out the general form of such a φ, by asking which events are
true according to φ, i.e. for which A ∈ A one has φ(A) = 1. Suppose A ∈ A, φ(A) = 1
and A ⊆ B. Then, since AB = A, we have by multiplicativity, φ(A)φ(B) = φ(A) = 1 ⇒
φ(B) = 1. Thus φ is monotone: any superset of a true event is also true. Now suppose
that A and B are both true with respect to φ. It follows immediately that they have in
common some true “subevent” (i.e. subset) C ⊆ A,B; for A ∩ B = AB is such a subset
and φ(AB) = φ(A)φ(B) = 1 × 1 = 1. By induction, there must be a smallest true event
F ∈ A with the property that the other true events coincide with its supersets: 11
φ(A) = 1 ⇐⇒ F ⊆ A (1)
In this scheme, then, a coevent can be construed as a subset F of Ω, and the rule (1) tells
us that, with respect to a given coevent φ, reality “has the property A” iff all the atoms
in F “share this property”. Since (1) is a simple generalization of the above definition of
γ∗, it is natural to write it as: φ = F ∗. One can also see that, for any F ∈ A,
F ∗ =
∏
γ∈F
γ∗
11 We are just using the fact that φ−1(1) is a filter, when φ 6= 0, 1 is multiplicative.
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Thus a multiplicative coevent is simply a polynomial that reduces to a monomial (Graph-
ically it is a single simplex), and the support of φ is F itself:
F = supp(φ) . (2)
Finally, remember that we want φ to be as nearly homomorphic as it can be. Recalling
that φ would be a homomorphism if its support were reduced to a single atom, let us
postulate that F = suppφ is as small as possible. Our final axioms for this scheme are
then:
(iii) no precluded A ∈ A contains F as a subset
(iv) F is minimal subject to (iii)
(Axiom (iii) requires that F meet the complement of every precluded subset.) I will write
Â for the set of all coevents that satisfy these axioms. The elements of Â are thus the
“possible realities”, or “possible bundles of attributes of reality”, depending on how we
think about a coevent.
Now consider a two-slit diffraction experiment distilled down to a set of four trajec-
tories joining either of two “apertures”, a1, a2 to either of two “detector locations” ℓ1, ℓ2.
(We don’t include any actual detectors.) Calling s the source, we have
Ω = {sa1ℓ1, sa1ℓ2, sa2ℓ1, sa2ℓ2} ≡ {γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4} .
Suppose that γ1 and γ3 interfere destructively. To each γi corresponds an amplitude
αi (assuming unitary quantum mechanics), and, respecting unitarity, we may take these
amplitudes to be (
α1 α2
α3 α4
)
=
1√
2
(
1 1
−1 1
)
The only precluded event is then γ1+γ3, which I have written using the algebraic notation
introduced earlier. (Regarded as a subset of Ω this event would be {γ1, γ3}, which, strictly
speaking, should be written as {γ1} + {γ3}. But the distinction disappears when one
identifies γi with {γi}, as we are doing.) In order to be preclusive, φ must therefore satisfy
φ(γ1 + γ3) = 0.
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In the multiplicative scheme, F = φ−1(1) must not be contained within γ1+γ3 (axiom
(iii)). Hence it must contain either γ2 or γ4. For example, F = γ2 + γ3 will do, as will
F = γ4 + γ1 + γ3. Clearly the minimal sets of this sort are just γ2 and γ4 themselves,
corresponding to the coevents γ∗2 and γ
∗
4 . These two coevents are the members of Â, and
both are purely classical. In each, the particle goes through a single slit and continues on
to the “bright spot”, avoiding the “dark spot”.
A more interesting example is three-slit diffraction, as described in [1]. For simplic-
ity, let’s limit ourselves to three trajectories, a, b, c, all meeting at a common “detector
location”, and let the corresponding amplitudes be respectively 1, 1, −1. Now both a+ c
and b + c are precluded, whence no classical coevent can be preclusive, since a + c and
b + c together cover all of Ω. 12 Classical logic leads to an impasse in this case. In the
multiplicative scheme, F = φ−1(1) = supp(φ) must contain both a and b in order to avoid
falling within either a+ c or b+ c. The only possibilities are F = a+ b and F = a+ b+ c,
of which only the former is minimal. Hence Â contains a single coevent in this example,
namely φ = (a + b)∗ = a∗b∗; and for it, φ(a) = φ(b) = φ(c) = φ(a + c) = φ(b + c) = 0,
φ(a+b) = φ(a+b+c) = 1. Thus for example, the answer to “Does the particle go through
slit a?” is “No”, but the answer to “Does it go through some slit?” is “Yes”. (One
could perhaps imagine these questions in terms of idealized “observations” that discover
no more or less than the question asked for; but of course it would be wrong to identify
such “observations” with any ordinary physical operations except in very special cases.)
In this example, the important thing to notice is that there is a viable coevent — only one
in this case, but nevertheless enough to avoid the untenable conclusion that classical logic
would have reached.
As a final example, consider one that figured heavily in an earlier interpretation of the
path-integral [3]. Here we have two variables A and B, each of which can take only the
12 Proving this by computation provides good practice in the algebraic notation (even
though the set-theoretic notation happens to be considerably simpler in this case). We
have in general X∪Y = X+Y +XY . Hence (a+c)∪(b+c) = (a+c)+(b+c)+(a+c)(b+c)
= a+ b+ 2c+ ab+ ac+ cb+ c2 = a+ b+ 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + c = a+ b+ c = Ω.
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value +1 or −1. If we write A for the event that A = 1 and A′ for the event that A = −1,
and similarly for B, then our four-element sample space can be written as
Ω = AB + AB′ + A′B + A′B′ .
Assume that A and B are perfectly correlated, in the dynamical sense that µ(AB′) =
µ(A′B) = 0. From this it follows as well that µ(A + B) = µ(AB′ + A′B) = 0, assuming
that µ is strongly positive. 13 So our precluded events are AB′, A′B, and A+ B. (Notice
that A + B is the event that A and B are anti-correlated.) With our sample space of
4 elements, we have |Ω| = 4, |A| = 2|Ω| = 16, |A∗| = 2|A| = 65536, where | · | denotes
cardinality. Of these 65 thousand or so coevents, sixteen are multiplicative, since there are
24 = 16 subsets of Ω to play the role of F = supp(φ). Which of these sixteen coevents
are preclusive, and which of the preclusive ones are minimal? Reasoning as before, we
see that F must contain either AB or A′B′. But φ = (AB)∗ is already preclusive, as is
φ = (A′B′)∗. Hence these are the only minimal preclusive multiplicative coevents. Once
again, we’ve reached the classical solution:
Â = {(AB)∗, (A′B′)∗} .
Indeed this had to happen, because the pattern of preclusions was classical in the
sense that it could have arisen from a classical probability-measure µ. Equivalently, every
subset of a precluded set was also precluded. One can prove that when this happens the
minimal φ are just the classical coevents γ∗, for non-precluded γ. Hence the multiplicative
scheme, like the linear one, reproduces classical logic when quantal interference is absent.
Although this example of “A-B-correlations” turned out to be fairly trivial in the end,
it is important because it illustrates how “anhomomorphic inference” works. Classically
we can conclude from “A+B is false” that exactly one of AB, A′B′ is true. Consequently,
if A is true then B must be true and B′ false (together with A′). None of these deductions
is guaranteed a priori in anhomomorphic logic. But our analysis of the above example
shows that if not only A+B, but also A′B and AB′ are false (which classically would have
13 Strong positivity of the decoherence functional, as defined in [4], holds automatically in
unitary quantum mechanics. Via an analog of the Schwarz inequality, it implies µ(A∪N) =
µ(A) whenever N has measure zero and is disjoint from A.
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followed from A + B false), then classical logic does apply, whence the truth of A does
imply that of B and conversely. [proof: if φ(A) = 1 then φ cannot be (A′B′)∗ because
(A′B′)∗(A) = 0 since A′B′ 6⊆ A. Hence φ = (AB)∗ (the only other possibility in Â),
whence φ(B) = 1 and φ(A′) = φ(B′) = 0.]
Finally, let’s turn briefly to the “ideal-based” scheme that generalizes the linear scheme
of [1]. For lack of space, I will only sketch this scheme and its application to the above
examples. Its advantage is its greater flexibility and generality, but its disadvantage is
that it is harder to state. The basic idea is that φ should be preclusive (as always),
and that the members of Â should be the “simplest” that suffice to generate A∗0 as an
ideal. 14 Here A∗0 denotes the ideal of all preclusive coevents, and “simple” is yet another
word meaning “close to homomorphic”. In the present context it seems best to interpret
“simplicity” not in terms of the support of φ, but rather in terms of — say — the number of
operations needed to build up φ as a polynomial p in the classical coevents. Thus defined,
simplicity is measured by the sum of the degrees of the monomials whose sum is p. The
smaller is this sum, the “simpler” is φ. We then want to take for Â the generating set of
“maximum simplicity”, or perhaps just the unital members of this set. (In detail, there will
be different ways to compare the simplicity of coevents and sets of coevents; in addition
it could happen that the simplest generating set was not unique. None of these potential
ambiguities surfaces in any of our three examples.)
Applying the ideal-based scheme to our three examples, we find the following (limiting
ourselves to the generators that are unital):
2-slit: Â = same as above. 15
3-slit: Â = {a∗ + b∗ + c∗, a∗b∗}
A-B-correlations: Â = same as above
14 An ideal in an algebra is a linear subspace of the algebra which is closed under multi-
plication by arbitrary algebra elements. A subset S of an ideal I generates it if I is the
smallest ideal including S. It is not difficult to verify that the preclusive coevents form an
ideal.
15 There is also a non-classical generator, a∗ + b∗, but it’s not unital.
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Thus in these examples, the ideal-based scheme differs from the multiplicative scheme
only in the three-slit example, where it yields a second coevent, namely the unique coevent
produced by the linear scheme of [1]. With respect to this coevent, a, b and c all become
true, while a+ b becomes false.
One pleasant feature of the ideal-based scheme is that (as one can prove) if an event
A ∈ A is not precluded then there exists φ ∈ Â for which A happens (φ(A) = 1).
Remark Notice that anhomomorphic logic shifts the emphasis from individual histories
γ ∈ Ω to the algebra of predicates A. This shift could seem like a retreat from reality,
but it is perhaps natural from a “dialectical” starting point that takes the whole as prior
to its parts. To “unexamined materialism”, reality is simply a single history γ ∈ Ω, what
I called earlier a “formal trajectory”. Yet such an element only begins to take shape
when we subdivide the whole into its (spatio-temporally separated) parts. To the extent
that the subdivision remains to be completed, as it always must, we recognize only a
“coarse-grained world” corresponding to the subalgebra of A generated by the coarse-
grained variables. Perhaps such musings lend a greater “dignity” to the elements of A, as
being in some sense logically prior to those of Ω. Anhomomorphic logic is also “dialectical”
in a second, more obvious sense: it “admits contradictions”.
It’s a pleasure to thank Fay Dowker and Yousef Ghazi-Tabatabai for providing some key
examples that helped give birth to the multiplicative and ideal-based schemes. Research
at Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics is supported in part by the Government of
Canada through NSERC and by the Province of Ontario through MRI. This research was
partly supported by NSF grant PHY-0404646.
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